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Abstract. This chapter reviews recent philosophical and neuroethical literature on the 
morality of moral neuroenhancements. It first briefly outlines the main moral arguments 
that have been made concerning moral status neuroenhancements. These are 
neurointerventions that would augment the moral status of human persons. It then 
surveys recent debate regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements: 
neurointerventions that augment that the moral desirability of human character traits, 
motives or conduct. This debate has contested, among other claims (i) Ingmar Persson 
and Julian Savulescu’s contention that there is a moral imperative to pursue the 
development of moral desirability neuroenhancements, (ii) Thomas Douglas’ claim that 
voluntarily undergoing moral desirability neuroenhancements would often be morally 
permissible, and (iii) David DeGrazia’s claim that moral desirability neuroenhancements 
would often be morally desirable. The chapter discusses a number of concerns that have 
been raised regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements, including concerns that 
they would restrict freedom, would produce only a superficial kind of moral 
improvement, would rely on technologies that are liable to be misused, and would 
frequently misfire, resulting in moral deterioration rather than moral improvement. 
In recent years, a number of philosophers and neuroethicists have become interested in moral 
enhancements. These are usually taken to be interventions that aim to and (expectably) 
succeed in augmenting the morality of an individual or one or more of her traits. This chapter 
follows recent literature in discussing only moral enhancements of human persons or their 
traits and the term ‘moral enhancement’ is henceforth used to refer only to enhancements of 
this sort.  
Humans have traditionally sought to morally enhance themselves through means such 
as introspective reflection, engagement with literature or calm moral discussion with others, 
and to morally enhance others through rational persuasion, the application of incentives or 
disincentives or moral education. However, prompted by developments in the cognitive 
sciences, much recent discussion of moral enhancement has focused instead on moral 
neuroenhancement. Moral neuroenhancement can be distinguished from more traditional 
varieties of moral enhancement by the fact that it operates by altering brain states or processes 
directly, that is, not by (i) modifying the agent’s environment (as in the application of 
incentives), or (ii) by engaging the agent’s deliberative capacities (as in introspective 
reflection or rational persuasion). Paradigmatic examples of moral neuroenhancement would 
operate via the administration of drugs or application of brain modulation techniques such as 
electrical or magnetic brain stimulation. 
Moral neuroenhancements all involve increasing the morality of an individual or trait. 
Thus, two natural ways of classifying moral enhancements are according to the metric by 
which morality is measured and the target of the enhancement—that is, the entity whose 
morality is augmented. Possible metrics of moral neuroenhancement would include be moral 
status, moral considerability, moral responsibility, moral understanding, moral virtue, moral 
desirability, moral rightness, or moral permissibility. Possible targets of moral 
neuroenhancement would include the human person or his character, motives or conduct. 
There are various ways in which one could combine different metrics and targets to describe 
different varieties of moral neuroenhancement. However, two kinds of moral 
neuroenhancement have dominated recent discussion of this topic, namely: (1) 
neuroenhancements of the moral status of humans (henceforth, moral status 
neuroenhancements or MSNs) and (2) neuroenhancements of the moral desirability of human 
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character traits, motives and conduct (henceforth, moral desirability neuroenhancements or 
MDNs).  
 Two main kinds of question have been asked about MSNs and MDNs: questions about 
their possibility, and questions about their morality. For example, there have been discussions 
of whether MSNs or MDNs are possible or likely to become technically feasible. And there 
have also been discussions of when, if ever, it would be morally permissible, desirable or 
obligatory to (a) pursue the development of technologies that would or might enable MSN or 
MDN, (b) undergo a MSN or MDN oneself, or (c) impose such an intervention on others.  
This chapter outlines some of the main arguments that have been advanced concerning 
the morality of MSNs (section 1) and MDNs (sections 2-5). Discussions concerning the 
possibility of MSNs and MDNs are touched upon where relevant to arguments concerning 
their morality, but are not comprehensively surveyed. 
1. Moral Status Neuroenhancements 
Moral status neuroenhancements aim to and (expectably) succeed in bringing it about that a 
human enjoys greater moral status than she would otherwise have enjoyed. There is 
disagreement regarding how to understand moral status, but one way of understanding it is as 
a metric of the strength and breadth of moral protections (such as moral rights or claims) 
enjoyed by a being. Understood thus, moral status neuroenhancements could operate, for 
example, by conferring additional moral rights on humans. 
 Recent discussion of moral status enhancements has taken place primarily within 
debates on the morality of general cognitive or mental neuroenhancements (CROSSREF: 
section introduction ‘Neuroenhancement’ and chapters ‘Reflections on Neuroenhancements’, 
‘Neuroscience, drug policy, and drug regulation, including enhancement use of 
pharmaceuticals’, ‘The Ethics of Mood Enhancement’). It has in large part been stimulated by 
a speculative comment offered by Francis Fukuyama in a 2004 critique of transhumanism, the 
movement most committed to human neuroenhancement. Francis Fukuyama writes that  
Underlying [the] idea of the equality of rights is that we all possess a human 
essence that dwarfs manifest differences in skin color, beauty, and even 
intelligence. This essence, and the view that individuals therefore have inherent 
value, is at the heart of political liberalism. But modifying that essence is the 
core of the transhumanist project. If we start transforming ourselves into 
something superior, what rights will these enhanced creatures claim, and what 
rights will they possess when compared to those left behind? (Fukuyama 2004, 
p. 42) 
One of Fukuyama’s worries here is that enhanced beings might claim greater rights than are 
enjoyed by unenhanced humans. But another concern is that enhanced beings would actually 
have greater rights than the unenhanced. This latter concern can be interpreted as a concern 
that human neuroenhancement could result in the creation of beings with greater moral status 
than ordinary persons (call such beings status-enhanced beings or SEBs). This proposition has 
been the object of substantial subsequent analysis, most notably by Allen Buchanan 
(2009;2011;2012). 
Why might neuroenhancement result in the creation of SEBs? The usual explanation 
draws on an analogy. It is often thought that ordinary adult humans enjoy higher moral status 
than at least some of our nonhuman mammalian relatives. In addition, it is often thought that 
our elevated moral status, relative to other mammals, can be attributed to our possessing 
greater mental capacity than other mammals. (Precisely which mental capacities confer higher 
moral status on us is open to dispute, but candidates include our capacities for self-awareness, 
rationality and moral agency.) But if we enjoy greater mental capacity than our mammalian 
relatives in virtue of our greater mental capacity, one might expect that beings whose mental 
capacity exceeded our own to a similar degree would enjoy greater moral status than us, and it 
might seem that the neuroenhancement of humans could, at least in principle, produce such 
beings.  
But the creation of SEBs would, it has been argued, be morally problematic since the 
existence of SEBs would be bad for ordinary persons (e.g. Agar 2012). Arguably, ordinary 
persons could be permissibly harmed for the sake of these SEBs in ways that they may not be 
permissibly harmed for the sake of one another. For example, perhaps persons could 
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permissibly be used, without their consent, in medical experiments designed to aid SEBs. Or 
perhaps persons could be rightly excluded from the democratic institutions of the SEBs.  
Three main responses have been made to this line of thought. First, some authors have 
questioned whether human neuroenhancements could produce beings of greater moral status 
than ordinary persons. For example, Allen Buchanan (2009; 2011) and James Wilson (2007; 
2012) argue for a threshold account of moral status according to which there is some level of 
mental capacity above which all beings have the same moral status, and beyond which 
ordinary persons already lie (see also Savulescu 2009; Wikler 2009). Buchanan invokes 
Stephen Darwall’s (2006) work to argue that the ability to engage in practices of mutual 
accountability is what takes one across the threshold, while Wilson argues that a being has 
crossed the threshold if it possesses Rawls’ two moral powers—a sense of justice and a 
“capacity to have, revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good” (Rawls 2001, p. 
19). In reply, a number of authors have questioned whether there is good reason to prefer this 
threshold account of moral status to (a) a scalar account, according to which moral status is 
continuously rising with some aspect of mental capacity, or (b) a multi-threshold account, 
according to which there are multiple thresholds of mental capacity making out differences in 
moral status, including at least one threshold that lies above the level of mental capacity 
possessed by ordinary human persons (McMahan 2009; Douglas 2011a; DeGrazia 2012; Agar 
2012).   1
A second response has been to argue that, even if human neuroenhancements could 
produce SEBs, this would not be bad for ordinary persons. For example, Buchanan (2009; 
2011) argues that persons already possess enough moral status to be inviolable and that this 
protects them against being exploited in the ways that those concerned about the creation of 
SEBs fear. For example, because persons possess enough moral status to be inviolable, they 
could not permissibly be used, against their will, in medical experiments designed to aid 
SEBs. However, in reply, it has been argued that the inviolability enjoyed by ordinary persons 
is not absolute, so that SEBs could be more inviolable than us (Agar 2012; Douglas 2011a; 
McMahan 2009). Thus, for example, when faced with a choice between killing an ordinary 
person and killing an SEB in order to avert some catastrophe, it might be permissible to kill 
the person but not the SEB. It has also been argued that the existence of SEBs might be bad 
for mere persons in ways that are unrelated to inviolability. For example, SEBs might have 
stronger claims to scarce resources, such as healthcare, than ordinary persons (Douglas 
2011a). 
Finally, a third response to concerns regarding the creation of SEBs has been to argue 
that, even if human neuroenhancements could create SEBs and this would be bad for ordinary 
persons, it may still be morally permissible, or even morally desirable, to create such beings. 
For example, Douglas (2011a; 2012), Persson (2012) and Wasserman (2012) argue that costs 
to ordinary persons associated with the existence of SEBs might be compensated by other 
advantages, or might be outweighed by goods enjoyed by the SEBs themselves. By contrast, 
Agar (2012) has argued that the costs of MSNs for the unenhanced are unlikely to be 
compensated by other benefits. 
2. Moral Desirability Neuroenhancements 
Moral desirability enhancements (MDNs) aim to and (expectably) succeed in augmenting the 
moral desirability of a person’s character traits, motives or conduct (henceforth, collectively, 
 Each of these authors relies to some extent on an inductive inference, most fully spelled out by Agar 1
(2012): observed differences in mental capacity generate differences in moral status, and unobserved 
differences in mental capacity, between us and mentally enhanced beings, could be at least as great, 
thus we should expect that these too will give rise to differences in moral status. David Wasserman 
(2012) has recently offered an inductive argument militating in the opposite direction. He notes that the 
development of civilization, for example from feudalism to contemporary social arrangements, has 
tended to elide distinctions in moral status so that we now accept fewer tiers of moral status than 
previously. If we assume that this is due to moral-epistemic progress, then we might infer that we are in 
the process of converging on a correct view of moral status that accepts very few tiers of moral status 
(perhaps simply a binary view that entities either have moral status or not). Such a view might render 
implausible the claim that mentally enhanced beings could have greater moral status than us.
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‘psychological features’). The moral desirability of a psychological feature—often referred to 
simply as its moral goodness—corresponds to, or is at least correlated with, the degree to 
which there are typically agent-neutral moral reasons to promote that feature. It is to be 
distinguished, from the moral worth or moral praiseworthiness of a psychological feature 
(also sometimes referred to using the term ‘moral goodness’) which is instead standardly 
understood as the degree to which an agent merits praise for possessing that trait. Morally 
desirable traits are often also morally worthy, but they need not be.  
 Some psychological features may be noninstrumentally morally desirable. For 
example, Kant (1964) can be interpreted as arguing that a good will is noninstrumentally 
morally desirable; many have held that those character traits which qualify as virtues are 
noninstrumentally morally desirable; and many would also hold that respectful actions are, at 
least in one respect, noninstrumentally morally desirable. But character traits, motives and 
actions can also be instrumentally morally desirable, because they produce outcomes that are 
themselves morally desirable. For example, breaking a promise, though perhaps in one way 
morally undesirable, might also be in one way morally desirable when it results in lives being 
saved, pain being averted, or knowledge being gained. In what follows, moral desirability will 
be taken to include both instrumental and noninstrumental moral desirability. MDNs can thus 
be understood as interventions aim to and (expectably) succeed in increasing the total 
instrumental and noninstrumental value of a person’s character traits, motives or conduct. 
Note that, on some views, the same interventions will qualify as both moral status 
neuroenhancements and moral desirability neuroenhancements. For example, on some 
Kantian views, possession of a good will is both a morally desirable character trait and what 
confers moral status on a being. On this view, it seems possible that improving a person’s will 
via neuroenhancement—supposing that this were possible—could constitute both a MSN and 
a MDN. 
Types of Moral Desirability Neuroenhancement 
MDNs are unified by the kind of moral value that they augment: moral desirability. However, 
as already noted, they may differ in their target, with some targeting a person’s conduct, 
others her motives, and others still her character traits. MDNs that target a person’s character 
or character traits could be aptly described as enhancements of moral virtue since, on some 
understandings of virtue, the moral virtues are often understood to be morally desirable 
character traits. However, moral virtue is also sometimes understood in other ways—for 
example, as referring to morally praiseworthy character traits. 
MDNs can also be distinguished by the means they employ. As instances of 
neuroenhancement, all MDNs operate by directly modulating the brain states of an agent. 
However, we can distinguish them according to the way in which brain modulation is 
supposed to enhance the moral desirability of the agent’s character, motives or conduct. Some 
MDNs might operate by directly altering an agent’s mental capacities or abilities but without 
directly influencing any mental state. For example, Fröding (2011) suggests that certain 
cognitive neuroenhancements, for example, those which mitigate cognitive biases, would in 
some cases facilitate the development of moral virtues. Similarly, one can imagine that an 
intervention which enhanced an agent’s ability to vividly imagine the consequences of her 
actions might contribute to morally more desirable conduct.  
These interventions would alter mental states only indirectly, by influencing the agent’s 
mental capacities. Other MDNs might operate by directly influencing an agent’s mental 
states, for example, by directly altering the agent’s beliefs, desires, intentions or emotions. 
Perhaps an intervention could enhance the moral desirability of an agent’s conduct by 
augmenting her feelings of sympathy, her desire to help others or her belief in the importance 
of moral requirements. Within the category of MDNs that directly influence an agent’s mental 
states we can distinguish between those that directly influence cognitive states (such as 
beliefs), conative states (such as desires and intentions) and affective states (such as 
emotions). As discussed below, some concerns that have been raised about MDNs are specific 
to MDNs that operate by directly altering certain kinds of mental state. 
Scientific Prospects for Moral Desirability Neuroenhancement 
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Spence (2008) argues that within psychiatry, some medications, such as those used to treat 
antisocial personality disorder, substance abuse and psychosis, are already being used as 
MDNs in some circumstances. It might also plausibly be argued that anti-testosterone agents 
and other medications used to prevent sexual re-offending in some European and North 
American jurisdictions are intended to improve the moral desirability of the sex offender’s 
conduct.  
 Most discussions of MDNs have, however, treated such enhancements as a prospect for 
the future rather than a contemporary phenomenon. To establish the plausibility of the claim 
that MDNs might become feasible or commonplace in the future, some have pointed to recent 
findings from moral psychology and neuroscience which are beginning to uncover the neural 
bases of morally significant character traits, motives and behavior, and in some cases, to 
suggest possible interventions capable of modifying these (e.g., Savulescu and Persson 2012). 
For example, the neurotransmitter oxytocin appears to have significant affects on trust and co-
operativeness between people (e.g. Zak 2004; Kosfeld 2005; De Dreu 2010, 2011), and a 
number of widely used drugs, including the beta-blocker propranolol and a selective serotonin 
re-uptake inhibitors, a class of anti-depressants, appear to have significant effects on human 
moral psychology (e.g. Crockett 2008, 2010; Terbeck 2012). Shook (2012) and Levy et al. 
(forthcoming) review some recent empirical findings relevant to future prospects for MDN.  
Motives for Discussing the Morality of Moral Desirability Neuroenhancements 
  
There have been two main motives for assessing the morality of MDNs. Some have assessed 
hypothetical MDNs as a way to test arguments that have been made regarding the morality of 
neuroenhancement or bioenhancement more generally (CROSSREF: section introduction 
‘Neuroenhancement’ and chapters ‘Reflections on Neuroenhancements’, ‘Neuroscience, drug 
policy, and drug regulation, including enhancement use of pharmaceuticals’, ‘The Ethics of 
Mood Enhancement’). For example, Douglas (2008) presents certain kinds of MDN as 
counterexamples to the claim that it is always morally impermissible to  biologically augment 
one’s capacities from an already-normal level.  
Other authors have discussed MDNs for more practical reasons: because they believe 
that there is a realistic prospect of MDNs being attempted in the future and wish to encourage, 
forestall or morally appraise such attempts or the technological developments that would 
enable them. For example, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that MDNs 
might help humanity to escape its own destruction and should therefore be pursued, while 
John Harris, Robert Sparrow, Nick Agar and others have raised serious moral concerns 
regarding MDNs. 
The following two sections outline some of the main moral positions that have been 
taken on MDNs and some of the dominant arguments that have been made for and against 
those positions. As in the discussion of MSNs, arguments concerning the possibility of MDNs 
are discussed only insofar as they have figured in arguments concerning their morality.  
3. Persson and Savulescu’s Defense of an Imperative to Pursue the Development of 
MDNs 
The most forthright and provocative defence of MDNs has been offered by Ingmar Persson 
and Julian Savulescu, who argue that there is “an urgent imperative to enhance the moral 
character of humanity” and to pursue research into moral neuroenhancements as a possible 
means to this end (2008, p. 162; see also 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). Persson and Savulescu 
argue that scientific progress, aided by cognitive neuroenhancement, is likely to bring it about 
that even small numbers of malevolent agents could cause great harm. For example, they 
suggest that scientific advances may allow even a single scientifically-trained individual to 
produce a designer pathogen capable of wiping out humanity, making it almost certain that 
humanity will indeed be destroyed. On the other hand, they argue, scientific progress will not 
have any benefits sufficiently great to make it rational to accept this risk of great harm, in part 
because it is generally easier to cause a harm than to cause a comparably large benefit, and in 
part because it is rational to be somewhat more averse to harms than attracted to benefits. 
They maintain that: 
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It will be bad for us that scientific knowledge continues to grow by traditional means, 
and even worse if this growth is further accelerated by biomedical or genetic 
enhancement of our cognitive capacities. For if an increasing percentage of us acquires 
the power to destroy a large number of us, it is enough if very few of us are malevolent 
or vicious enough to use this power for all of us to run an unacceptable increase of the 
risk of death and disaster. To eliminate this risk, cognitive enhancement would have to be 
accompanied by a moral enhancement which extends to all of us, since such moral 
enhancement could reduce malevolence (2008, p. 166). 
This moral enhancement, as they understand it, will consist in the acquisition of morally 
better (in the sense of more morally desirable) motivational dispositions. Persson and 
Savulescu argue that neither traditional forms of moral enhancement, such as moral 
education, nor cognitive enhancements (traditional or otherwise) are likely to produce the 
necessary moral enhancement. They also suggest that it is unlikely that the risks of great harm 
can be mitigated by holding back cognitive enhancement and scientific progress (2008, p. 
173). Thus, they argue that we should pursue the possibility of moral neuroenhancements by, 
among other things, conducting scientific research that might facilitate their development (on 
this claim, see also Hughes 2006, 2011). This argument has attracted four main types of 
criticism. 
Criticism 1: Misuse of Moral Enhancement Technologies 
Persson and Savulescu are concerned that the products of technological development might 
be misused to devastating effect. Some authors have responded by noting that the moral 
enhancement technologies whose development they call for, or the scientific information that 
would need to be acquired in order to develop them, could themselves be misused by 
malevolent agents (Ehni & Aurenque p. 231-2; Fenton 2010; Harris 2011, p. 108; Sparrow, 
forthcoming, under review). Presumably, if we were technologically capable of bringing it 
about that people have more morally desirable character traits, motives or conduct, we could 
also bring it about that people have less desirable traits, motives or conduct, and some agents 
might well be more interested in decreasing moral desirability than increasing it. For example, 
we can imagine that a ruthless businessman or soldier might want to suppress pangs of 
conscience and that this might bring about morally undesirable motives and conduct.  
Persson and Savulescu’s response to these concerns has been to concede that 
technologies which enable MDNs could be misused, but maintain that pursuit of MDNs is 
nevertheless our only hope of avoiding ultimate harm (Persson and Savulescu 2011a, p. 443). 
Criticism 2: Misconstrual of the Risks and Benefits of Scientific Progress 
A second critical response has been to argue that Persson and Savulescu have overstated the 
risks or understated the benefits associated with further scientific progress. For example, 
Elizabeth Fenton maintains that, in characterising the likely benefits of scientific progress as 
consisting in “only a small increase in an already high quality of life”, Persson and Savulescu 
both underestimate the size of the likely benefits of scientific progress and misconstrue the 
likely starting point (2010, p. 149, her italics). She argues that the benefits of scientific 
progress would in many cases be enjoyed by individuals whose quality of life is poor, for 
example, due to disease, famine or pollution, and for whom the benefits of such progress 
would be substantial. She also argues, appealing to Buchanan (2008), that further scientific 
progress might in fact be necessary to prevent significant falls in quality of life (p. 150).  
John Harris (2011) also offers a response of this second variety. He disputes Persson 
and Savulescu’s claim that it is generally easier to harm than to benefit others by appealing to 
cases in which it seems easy to cause large benefits by making donations, initiating public 
health programmes, providing vaccines or preventing others from inflicting great harm (pp 
106-7). Suppose you know that someone is planning a mass shooting and have access to the 
gun they will use; you might then be able to save many lives by removing the bullets from 
this gun. Harris suggests that in this sort of case, it seems at least as easy for you to save the 
lives at stake as it is for the prospective shooter to end them. Harris has also argued that 
cognitive neuroenhancement is itself a variety of moral neuroenhancement (2011, e.g. pp. 
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106, 110). The implication is that, if future technological progress is driven in part by 
cognitive neuroenhancement, we can expect that future people will also have more morally 
desirable character traits, motives and conduct than us. This might somewhat mitigate the risk 
that new technologies will be used to harmful effect.   
Persson and Savulescu offer a number of replies to claims that they have misconstrued 
the risk-benefit balance associated with further technological development, but perhaps the 
most important of these involves an appeal to the concept of ultimate harm: this is the harm of 
bringing it about that worthwhile life will never again exist. Persson and Savulescu argue that 
scientific progress will increase the risk of ultimate harm, and they take this to be an 
indefinitely bad outcome, since we have no way of knowing how much net value, in the form 
of continued worthwhile life, the ultimate harm prevents (e.g. 2011a, p. 442). On the other 
hand, they doubt that technological progress will similarly increase the likelihood of 
indefinitely good benefits.  Thus, they claim, we are in the position of weighing indefinitely 2
bad harms against substantial but definite benefits, and faced with this choice, it is rational to 
prefer that there is not further technological progress. 
Criticism 3: Implausible Implications 
  
Persson and Savulescu have also been criticised for being committed to intuitively 
implausible views. For example, Fenton (2010) argues that they are committed to the view 
that “all forms of scientific progress are instrumentally bad for humans overall” (p. 149, her 
italics). Their response is to argue that there has been a turning point. Before that point, 
scientific progress could be expected to produce net benefits; afterwards, it could be expected 
to produce net harms. They suggest that this turning point occurred when “science and 
technology put in the hands of humans the means of destroying or seriously damaging forever 
the conditions of sentient life on this planet” and speculate that this point may have come in 
the mid-twentieth century (Persson and Savulescu 2011a, p. 441). Meanwhile, Harris (2011) 
argues that Persson and Savulescu are committed to the view that it would be in one way 
desirable to retard the cognitive powers of current and future humans, thus slowing scientific 
progress. 
Criticism 4: Moral Neuroenhancement Won’t Help 
A fourth criticism of Persson and Savulescu’s argument maintains that pursuit of moral 
enhancement would do little to diminish the risk of ultimate harm (Harris, 2011, pp. 109-10). 
Since the risks that worry Persson and Savulescu are risks that could be created by lone 
malevolent agents, and since those agents are also likely to be able to avoid undergoing moral 
enhancement, it seems doubtful whether pursuit of moral enhancement would do much to 
reduce these risks. 
In response, Persson and Savulescu (2012) argue that technological progress can 
exacerbate risks of ultimate harm not only by allowing lone agents to wreak great havoc, but 
also by exacerbating the negative effects of widespread but mundane moral failings. For 
example, they argue that climate change may cause ultimate harm and that it can be attributed 
to a combination of technological development and human moral failings. Moral 
neuroenhancement might be capable of substantially reducing climate change even if not 
universally undergone. Thus, they suggest, MDNs might reduce some risks of ultimate harm 
even if they would fail to reduce others.  
4. Other Defences of MDNs 
 Persson and Savulescu (2011b, p. 4) do allow that one might contribute to an indefinitely large benefit 2
by preventing someone else from causing ultimate harm, something that technological progress might 
allow. However, they argue that, in that sort of case, one would not be guaranteeing an indefinitely 
large benefit, because someone else (or a natural disaster) might cause ultimate harm. By contrast, 
when one causes ultimate harm, one does guarantee an indefinitely bad harm. 
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Persson and Savulescu are interested in whether humanity falls under an imperative to pursue 
or promote the development of technologies that would enable MDNs. However, there are 
many other moral questions that we might ask regarding the morality of MDNs. For example, 
we might ask whether there is some weaker moral conclusion that could be made in favour of 
pursuing the development of MDNs: even if humanity falls under no imperative to promote 
MDNs, it might nevertheless be morally permissible, or even morally desirable, for it to do 
so. We could also move away from questions about what humanity as a whole ought to do to 
questions about what individual people, or groups of people, ought to do. Again, even if 
humanity falls under no imperative to promote MDNs, it might nevertheless be permissible, 
desirable or obligatory for individual people or groups of people to promote MDNs, to 
undergo MDNs themselves, or to encourage or require others to do so.  
 There is thus scope for weaker defences of MDN, and a number of such defences have 
been offered. For example, Thomas Douglas (2008) has argued that it would often be morally 
permissible for individuals to voluntarily engage in MDNs that expectably bring it about that 
they have more morally desirable motives than they would otherwise have had. More 
recently, David DeGrazia (forthcoming) has argued that moral desirability enhancements of 
motives or behavior would themselves be morally desirable, under certain idealizing 
assumptions. There have also been weaker defenses of specific means to MDN. For example, 
Douglas (2011b) argues that it could be morally permissible to enhance the moral desirability 
of one’s motives or conduct via directly modulating one’s emotions—that is, via means which, 
once set in train, modulate one’s emotions without requiring the engagement of one’s 
deliberative capacities.  
 It would be relatively uncontroversial that individuals have moral reasons to enhance 
the moral desirability of their character, motives and conduct, and that doing so is in one way 
morally desirable. These may even be analytic truths. Moreover, MDNs appear to be immune 
to many of the general concerns that have been raised about neuroenhancements (or 
bioenhancements more generally). These concerns have often focused on ways in which 
neuroenhancements undergone by some individuals might harm or wrong others, for example, 
by placing them at an unfair competitive disadvantage or undermining commitments to 
solidarity or equality. MDNs are unusual among the main types of neuroenhancements that 
have been discussed heavily in recent literature in that they might plausibly be expected to 
advantage, rather than disadvantage, others.  
 Nevertheless, some significant concerns have been raised regarding the permissibility 
and desirability of undergoing MDNs, or certain kinds of MDNs. Some of these are general 
concerns about enhancing the moral desirability of our characters, motives and conduct, 
whether through neuroenhancement or more traditional means. In this category are general 
skepticism about the possibility of moral improvement and concerns about whether we have 
adequate means for resolving disagreement and uncertainty about what character traits, 
motives and conduct are morally desirable and why. Debate regarding MDNs has elicited 
significant moral discussion on these points (Jotterand 2011; Schaefer 2011; Shook 2012; 
Wasserman 2011), but these concerns apply to traditional means of augmenting moral 
desirability as well as MDNs. Other concerns are general concerns about neuroenhancement 
that would apply to non-moral neuroenhancements as much as to MDNs. In this category are 
concerns regarding the unnatural means or hubristic motives that biomedical enhancement is 
said to involve (Kass 2003, Sandel 2007). Other concerns are, however, specific to MDNs—
they would not apply equally to traditional means of enhancing moral desirability or to other 
kinds of neuroenhancement. The remainder of this section outlines three dominant concerns 
in this category as well as some responses that have been offered to them by those who wish 
to defend at least some varieties of MDN. 
Concern 1: Restriction of Freedom  
One concern that has been raised regarding MDNs, or certain MDNs, is that such 
enhancements might restrict freedom or autonomy. Thus, for example, John Harris (2011) 
argues that we might have reason to abstain from MDNs because they would restrict our 
freedom to perform morally undesirable actions or to have morally undesirable motives (see 
also Ehni and Aurenque 2012, p. 233 and, for a more general discussion of the effects of 
neuroenhancement on autonomy, Bublitz and Merkel 2009).  
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A similar thought underpins the well-known free will defense of theism. The free will 
defense maintains that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent God is 
consistent with the presence of evil because evil is a consequence of our possessing the 
freedom to do evil, which is, all things considered, good. Though the freedom to do evil 
possesses the great instrumental disvalue of allowing evildoing, it also possesses some other, 
greater value. It is no surprise, then, that an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent God 
would have allowed evil to exist.  
If the freedom to do evil is all-things-considered valuable despite its very great 
instrumental disvalue, one might expect that the more general freedom to have morally 
undesirable character traits or motives or to act in morally undesirable ways (henceforth, the 
freedom to be immoral) is also good despite its instrumental disvalue. Perhaps, then, MDNs 
will be all-things-considered disvaluable whenever they restrict this freedom. 
Two main types of response have been made to this suggestion. The first has been to 
argue that, even where MDNs do restrict freedom, it might nevertheless be morally 
permissible or, all things considered, morally desirable to undergo such MDNs. The second 
has been to deny that all MDNs would restrict freedom, thus limiting the concern about 
freedom to a subset of MDNs. 
Responses of the first type parallel a standard response to the free will defense of 
theism. That response holds that, in many cases, it seems preferable to sacrifice some freedom 
to do evil in order to prevent evil than to tolerate both the freedom to do evil and the 
associated evil. If I witness one person about to murder another, it seems that I should 
intervene to prevent the murder even though this involves restricting the prospective murder’s 
freedom to do evil. Similarly, it seems that a would-be murderer should restrict his own 
freedom to do evil, thus preventing murder, if he is in a position to do so. The obvious way of 
explaining this conclusion is to suppose that, in at least some cases, any disvalue associated 
with restricting one’s freedom to do evil is outweighed by the value of doing so. Similarly, it 
has been argued that there will be cases of MDN where the disvalue of any loss in freedom to 
be immoral is outweighed by the value of increasing the moral desirability of one’s motives or 
conduct (DeGrazia, forthcoming; Douglas 2008, 2011b; Savulescu et al., forthcoming; 
Savulescu and Persson 2012). 
Responses in the second category sometimes begin by noting that concerns about the 
freedom-reducing effect of MDNs presuppose compatibilism—namely, the view that freedom 
is consistent with one’s motives and conduct being causally determined. For suppose 
compatibilism were false, and we could be free only if we were causally undetermined. In that 
case, we would either already be completely unfree, because we are causally determined, in 
which case MDNs could not reduce our freedom, or we are free only because we are, at least 
some of the time, immune from causal forces, in which case MDNs, which operate through 
causal channels, could not affect us in circumstances where we are currently free (Blackford 
2010; DeGrazia, forthcoming; Savulescu et al., forthcoming; Savulescu and Persson 2012). 
Thus, it is argued, concerns about the freedom-reducing effect of MDNs will have to be 
grounded on compatibilism. But on compatibilist views of freedom, whether MDNs diminish 
freedom is likely to depend on precisely how they operate.  
We can think of compatibilists as distinguishing between two aspects of our 
psychological life: a true or authentic self (which may be identified with higher order desires, 
or higher order desires that are not the result of inauthentic influences) and a brute self. 
Motives or actions are then thought of as free if and only if they are part of or flow from the 
true self. 
On this picture, MDNs could reduce our freedom to be immoral if they operate by 
strengthening the influence of the brute self vis-à-vis the true self. Consider an individual 
who, whenever approached by poverty-relief charities, feels a conflict between, on the one 
hand, a firm commitment, formed through introspective reflection, to the view that she owes 
nothing to the poor, and on the other hand, feelings of sympathy towards the poor which are 
the result of extraneous social pressures and which she experiences as unwanted. Suppose 
further that this individual, again, under social pressure, undergoes an intervention that 
directly augments her feelings of sympathy. Such an intervention might perhaps qualify as a 
MDN, and it will also, on many compatibilist views, restrict her freedom. A proponent of 
these views would deem this agent’s feelings of sympathy, both before and after the 
intervention, to be aspects of her brute self, while her moral commitments regarding charity 
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are an aspect of her true self. The intervention might thus plausibly be construed as one in 
which the influence of the agent’s brute self is expanded at the expense of the agent’s true 
self. One might expect that, following the intervention, a greater proportion of this agent’s 
motives and conduct would be unfree, where that implies that they are part of or flow from 
the brute, rather than the true, self.  
However, defenders of MDNs have argued that, just as we can paint a compatibilist 
picture of a MDN that restricts the freedom to be immoral, so too we can paint a picture of 
one that operates by increasing the freedom to be moral. They argue that, on any plausible 
compatibilist account of freedom, there will be some ways in which the conduct of some 
people is already unfree—because it flows from aspects of our brute selves. MDNs could 
operate precisely by attenuating the influence of these aspects of our brute selves (Douglas 
2008; 2011b; Savulescu et al., forthcoming). Thus, suppose that, when an agent is approached 
by worthy poverty-relief charities, she feels a pull between a reflectively formed commitment 
to the view that poverty-relief is morally required and a hoarding instinct not to part with any 
of one’s property that is unwanted and the result of external factors. In this case, many 
compatibilist views will deem the moral commitment to be part of the true self, and the 
hoarding instinct to be part of the brute self. Thus, it will be plausible that an MDN that 
attenuated the hoarding instinct would increase the agent’s freedom.  
Concern 2: Superficiality 
A second concern that has been raised regarding MDNs is targeted specifically at Douglas’ 
defense of MDNs that increase the moral desirability of one’s motives or conduct by directly 
modulating emotions (call such interventions ‘Emotional MDNs’). John Harris worries that 
an intervention which operates in this way “cannot be moral enhancement properly so called 
at all”. It “is hardly an enhancement, and certainly not one that has much to do with morality” 
(2012a, p. 4). Indeed, he maintains that “the notion of moral behaviour has been attenuated to 
a vanishing point” once one claims that such behaviour could be produced by directly altering 
emotions (2012a, p. 6); “tinkering with the emotions is not a form of moral enhancement at 
all. It is more like the threat of punishment: it may make immoral behaviour less likely, but it 
does not enhance morality” (2012b, pp. 3-4; see also Harris and Chan 2010; Sparrow, 
forthcoming; Sparrow, under review). 
One way of reading these passages would see them as asserting that Emotional MDNs 
are metaphysically, or at least physically, impossible. They violate some metaphysical or 
physical law. (Doubts regarding the possibility of MDNs more generally have also been 
raised by Ehni and Aurenque 2012, p. 232; Jotterand 2011; and Shook 2012.) However, it is 
difficult to see how this charge could be sustained. Emotions are mental states, mental states 
are normally taken to be either constitutively or causally dependent on brain states, and brain 
states are susceptible to direct modulation. It seems both metaphysically and physically 
possible to alter the emotions by directly influencing brain states. It also seems 
metaphysically and physically possible for alterations in one’s emotions to alter the moral 
desirability of one’s motives or conduct. For example, gratuitous killing of innocents in war is 
morally undesirable, and it is plausible that differences in the extent to which a solider 
experiences emotions such as a uncontrollable rage might influence whether or not that 
soldier engages in such morally undesirable conduct.  
Perhaps a more plausible way of interpreting Harris’ passages would see them as 
conceding that direct modulation of emotions could increase the moral desirability of one’s 
motives or conduct, but maintaining that it could not produce some deeper kind of moral 
improvement for which the term ‘moral enhancement’ should be reserved. Fabrice Jotterand 
(2011) makes a similar point, arguing that “moral neuroenhancement is unlikely to morally 
enhance people in the true meaning of the word” (p. 8), as does Robert Sparrow (under 
review), who suggests that “while there is indeed evidence that certain pharmaceutical and 
neuro-scientific interventions can alter dispositions and behaviour in ways that we may be 
inclined to morally evaluate positively, this falls well short of constituting ‘moral 
bioenhancement’ in any interesting sense”. These authors might be read as suggesting that the 
direct modulation of emotions could not produce deep moral improvement, where that might 
consist, for example, in an increase in the moral worth or virtue of one’s motives or conduct.  
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It would not, of course, follow from this that Emotional MDNs are absolutely morally 
undesirable in any way. To claim that Emotional MDNs fail to produce deep moral 
improvement is to claim that they lack some desirable feature, not that they possess some 
absolutely undesirable one. However, if Emotional MDNs fail to produce deep moral 
improvement, it might follow that they are less morally desirable than certain other ways of 
enhancing the moral desirability of our conduct that do produce such improvement. Harris 
(2011, 2012a, 2012b) can be read as maintaining that, while Emotional MDNs fail to produce 
deep moral improvement, more traditional, deliberative means of enhancing moral 
desirability, such as introspective reflection and engagement with literature, do produce deep 
moral improvement and should thus generally be adopted in preference to MDNs. 
Harris buttresses his claim that Emotional MDNs could not produce deep moral 
improvement by drawing a parallel between ‘being moral’, in the deeper sense in which he is 
interested, and ‘being scientific’: 
[o]ne can accidentally discover something of scientiﬁc importance, but one 
cannot be scientiﬁc, one cannot do science, accidentally. Doing science is a 
deliberative and disciplined process. It involves, for example, doing things like 
formulating and testing a hypothesis and looking for disconﬁrmatory evidence as 
well as for conﬁrmatory evidence . . . Being moral is like being scientiﬁc (Harris 
2012a, p. 6). 
He suggests that, unlike traditional means of enhancing moral desirability, Emotional MDNs 
could bring about morally desirable motives and conduct only by accident. One might argue 
for this view by noting that traditional means of enhancing moral desirability frequently 
operate by enhancing an agent’s moral understanding: her understanding of what morality 
requires and why, both in general, and on particular occasions on which one must make a 
morally significant decision. This moral understanding is an all-purpose tool that helps the 
agent to be motivated and act in morally desirable ways in many circumstances. If an agent 
understands what morality requires and why, she will be well-placed to be motivated and act 
in morally desirable ways in almost any circumstance.  
 On the other hand, Harris (2012a, 2012b) suggests, Emotional MDNs would not 
operate by enhancing the agent’s moral understanding. Others have made similar claims. For 
example, Fabrice Jotterand (2011) argues that “[w]hile the manipulation of moral emotions 
might change the behavior of an individual, it does not provide any content, for example, 
norms or values to guide one’s behavioral response” (p. 6, see also p. 8). Similarly, Robert 
Sparrow (forthcoming) suggests that “It is hard to see how any drug could alter our beliefs in 
such a way as to track the reasons we have to act morally” and that “[s]omeone who reads 
Tolstoy arguably learns to be less judgemental and in doing so develops greater 
understanding: someone who takes a pill has merely caused their sentiments to alter”. If these 
authors are correct, Emotional MDNs (and perhaps MDNs more generally) do not augment 
moral understanding. Instead, it might be argued, Emotional MDNs would typically work by 
removing some relatively straightforward emotional barrier to morally desirable motivation or 
conduct. The most obvious examples of such obstacles might include aggressive impulses, 
strongly xenophobic sentiments or a callousness or ruthlessness towards the suffering of 
others. But note that these are not universal barriers to moral desirable motivation and 
conduct. For example, one can imagine circumstances in which aggressive impulses or 
callousness would produce morally desirable motives and conduct; aggressiveness might do 
so when one is fighting a just war, or perhaps when one is confronted with one person 
assaulting another on the street, and ruthlessness might do so when one is a politician engaged 
in diplomatic negotiations (Douglas 2008; Savulescu et al., forthcoming; Wasserman 2011, 
forthcoming). Thus it might be thought that Emotional MDNs would produce only accidental 
or unreliable morally desirable motives and conduct.  
 There is little literature responding to Harris’ concern about the superficiality of 
Emotional MDNs, nor to the suggestion that Emotional MDNs could produce no more than 
accidental morally desirable motives and conduct. However, some defenders of MDN have 
suggested that such neuroenhancements could operate by attenuating emotional barriers to 
sound moral deliberation (Douglas 2008) or by bringing it about that we are more like those 
existing people who we regard as especially moral (Savulescu and Persson 2012; Savulescu et 
al., forthcoming), and one might expect that where they operate in this way they will, like 
more traditional forms of moral enhancement, increase moral understanding. In addition, 
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Wasserman (2011) has argued that, even if an Emotional MDN initially had no positive effect 
on moral understanding, we might expect the frequent presence of pro-moral emotions and 
the morally desirable motives or conduct to lead to a development in moral understanding 
over time. This parallels the Aristotelian point that one comes to know the good by being 
good (Burnyeat 1980).  
Concern 3: Misfiring 
A third concern that can be raised regarding MDNs maintains that attempts at MDNs are 
likely to misfire, bringing about moral deteriorations rather than improvements. This is not a 
concern about successful MDNs, but is rather the concern that actual attempts at MDN are 
likely to be unsuccessful.  
 Harris (2011) advances this concern by noting that “the sorts of traits or dispositions 
that seem to lead to wickedness or immorality are also the very same ones required not only 
for virtue but for any sort of moral life at all” (p. 104). He infers from this that the sorts of 
psychological alterations required for MDN would involve not the wholesale elimination or 
dramatic amplification of particular dispositions, but rather a kind of fine-tuning of our 
dispositions (see also Jotterand 2011, p. 7; Wasserman 2011). However, he argues that the 
disposition-modifying neurotechnologies that we are actually likely to have available to us 
will be rather blunt: it will be difficult to determine or even predict their effects precisely or to 
target the specific dispositions that we wish to shape. Thus, he suggests, it is unlikely that any 
attempt to use these technologies will succeed in bringing about an improvement in the moral 
desirability of our motives or conduct. 
 Nicholas Agar (2010; forthcoming; under review) sets forward a more limited variant 
of the concern. He argues that attempted MDNs may have good chances of success when they 
aim only to correct subnormal levels of moral desirability, bringing an individual within the 
normal range, but that they are likely to misfire when they aim to produce levels of moral 
desirability above the normal range (he does not comment on MDNs that operate wholly 
within the normal range). Subnormal moral desirability is often the result of relatively 
isolated and easily identified defects such as, for example, the deficient empathy that 
characterizes psychopathy. Agar speculates that these defects could relatively safely be 
corrected. However, he argues that, to attain supra-normal levels of moral desirability, we 
would need to simultaneously augment or attenuate several different dispositions in a 
balanced way. This, he claims, will be very difficult. One might suppose that this difficulty 
derives from three sources. First, there may be moral uncertainty—uncertainty regarding what 
character traits, motives or conduct qualify as supra-normally morally desirable. There would 
be significant disagreement on this matter, and that this disagreement may be both evidence 
for and a source of uncertainty (see e.g. Schaefer 2011). Second, there may be empirical 
uncertainty about what changes would need to be wrought in a given individual to realize the 
putatively desirable traits. Third, there might, for reasons suggested by Harris (2011), be 
practical difficulties in realizing these transformations using technologies that we have 
available to us. Taken together, these difficulties might create a serious risk that attempts to 
bring about supra-normal MDNs will fail.  
 The main response made to these concerns by defenders of MDN has been concessive. 
Defenders of MDNs have acknowledged both that (1) in many cases, complex and subtle 
interventions would be needed in order to enhance moral desirability and that (2) this creates 
a risk that attempted MDNs will fail, perhaps instead resulting in moral deterioration 
(Douglas 2011b; Savulescu et al., forthcoming). However, some doubt has been cast on the 
thought that this concern would always count decisively against attempting MDNs. For 
example, Douglas (2011b) notes that there are other areas—such as clinical psychiatry—
where we often also use rather blunt biological interventions as part of efforts to achieve 
subtle and multidimensional psychological changes. Yet in that area we normally think that 
attempting some interventions can be permissible and desirable if undergone cautiously, 
keeping open the option of reversing the intervention if it misfires. He suggests a similar 
approach might be justified in relation to MDNs. 
5. Further Questions 
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Ethical debate on MDNs has focused primarily on (1) the ethical status of promoting the 
development of technologies that would enable MDNs, as in the case of discussion 
surrounding Persson and Savulescu’s proposals, and on (2) the ethical status of voluntarily 
undergoing MDNs oneself, as in the case of discussion surrounding Douglas’ and DeGrazia’s 
proposals. Further questions might be asked regarding the ethical status of requiring or 
encouraging others to undergo such neuroenhancements. For example, one might wonder 
whether it would ever be permissible for a state to impose MDNs on its citizens, for courts to 
impose MDNs on convicted offenders, for parents to impose MDNs on their children, or for 
employers to impose MDNs on their employees. Such uses of MDNs would clearly raise, in 
addition to the concerns discussed above, concerns regarding, inter alia, coercion, 
manipulation and domination. For example, Sparrow suggests that imposing moral 
enhancements on others might, even if benevolently motivated, constitute an objectionable 
form of domination (forthcoming; under review; see also Bublitz and Merkel 2009). 
Meanwhile Walker (2009) and Blackford (2010) have responded to similar concerns as they 
might be raised in relation to the imposition of MDNs on one’s children or children-to-be.  
 Perhaps the context in which coercive use of MDNs is most likely to gain acceptance is 
that of criminal justice. Arguably, institutions of criminal justice, are, at least insofar as they 
offer criminal rehabilitation programs, already engaged in a kind of moral enhancement. In 
addition, concerns about moral disagreement, might be regarded as least serious in this 
context; criminal conduct is conduct that, if not universally taken to be morally undesirable, is 
at least widely accepted as conduct which the state and citizenry may legitimately seek to 
prevent. Concerns regarding coercion might also be regarded as weaker in the context of 
criminal justice, since a degree of coercion is also already accepted in that area: the 
paradigmatic criminal sanction, incarceration, is itself highly coercive. Nevertheless, it might 
be argued that forced MDNs in criminal justice would be more problematic than either 
incarceration or psychological rehabilitation programs, perhaps because more intrusive or 
manipulative. There is a burgeoning literature on this topic (Rosati 1994; Bomann-Larsen 
2011; Ryberg and Petersen 2011; Vincent 2012; Shaw 2012; Bublitz and Merkel 2012).  
 Questions might also be asked regarding the morality of selecting for morally desirable 
character traits in one’s children, for example, on the basis of genetic information acquired 
through pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. Moral enhancement and moral neuroenhancement 
have been understood in this chapter to involve augmenting the morality of some particular 
individual or her traits. On this understanding, selecting for moral traits in one’s children 
would not qualify as moral neuroenhancement, or indeed moral enhancement, since it instead 
involves bringing one  (expectably) more moral individual into existence in preference to 
another (expectably) less moral individual. However, some of the same issues arise in cases of 
selection as in cases of neuroenhancement discussed here, and there is some literature 
exploring these. For example, Faust (2008) argues that if parents were able to select for 
morally desirable traits in their future children it would be desirable, and probably obligatory, 
for them to do so, and Walker (2009) argues that principled reason not to select for moral 
virtues in one’s children, unless there is a principled reason not to engage in selection at all.  3
For criticism of these claims, see Agar (2010), Andreadis (2010), Arnhart (2010) and 
Bronstein (2010). 
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